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The Importance of Roman Law for Western 
Civilization and Western Legal Thought 
by Franz Wieacker* 
Part One: Ancient Roman Law 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I have been asked to speak about the importance of ancient and medieval 
Roman law for western civilization and western legal thought. After a general 
introduction, my first lecture will deal with the relevant characteristics of an-
cient Roman law. The subject of the second lecture will be the forms in which 
these elements were adopted by western society and the continuing presence of 
these "roots" in the modern legal systems of the European-Atlantic world. 
The large amount of material which has been handed down to us and which 
we encompass in the term "Roman law" forms a constituent part of the oc-
cidental world. It formed nations and legal systems and allowed them to 
become aware of their own identity. It provided the basis for the rational 
character of the systems and the legalism of the western nations. Further, even 
the very principle of settling social and economic conflicts not only by force, 
authority or compromise, but also by the application of general conceptual 
rules - which is the characteristic feature of western legal thought - became 
possible on the basis, and perhaps only on the basis, of Roman law, or what 
was thought to be Roman law. In reality, to use the fine words spoken in 
• Emeritus Professor of Roman Law and [German1 Civil Law, University of Gottingen, 
Federal Republic of Germany. The text of this article is taken from lectures given by Professor 
Wieacket at the Harvard Law School on April 8 and 9, 1980. Because the lectures are a synthesis 
of Professor Wieacker's works, it seemed best to leave the article in the lecture form in which it 
was given and not to provide a full complement of footnote support. The reader who wishes some 
further introduction in English to the material treated here might wish to consult H. JOLOWICZ & 
B. NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW (3d ed. 1972), for the 
Roman law, and W. ULLMANN, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE AGES (1975), for the medie-
val developments, both of which contain up-to-date bibliographies. For an elaboration of Pro-
fessor Wieacker's ideas and references, the reader is referred to three of his works: YOM 
ROMISHCEN RECHT (2d ed. 1961); ALLGEMEINE ZUSTANDE UND RECHTSZUSTANDE GEGEN EN DE 
DES WESTROMISCHEN REICHS (Ius Romanum Medii Aevi No. I, 2, a, 1963); PRIVATRECHTS· 
GESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT (2d ed. 1967). 
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honor of the famous European legal historian, Paul Koschaker, Roman law is 
a vinculum iuris quo totims occidms contin,tur [a bond of law by which so often the 
West is held together, ,d. j.I 
Although they developed along different lines, the two great legal systems of 
the Western world have this rational character in common, I am referring, of 
course, to a well-known dualism. On the one hand, there are the legal systems 
of the European continent and of Latin America. These systems are essentially 
characterized by the great codifications. In the first place, there are the Latin 
codes modeled after the Napoleonic codes. In the second place, there are the 
Central-European codes of Austria, Germany and Switzerland and their 
followers in other countries. Within the boundaries of the United States we 
find a well-known example of this legal system in the Code of Louisiana. On 
the other hand, there is the common law of the Anglo-American countries 
which, if you will allow me to speak as a continental legal historian, I regard as 
an historical unity. On the whole, this system is characterized by a unique 
court system and, despite the growing importance of statute law, by the 
dominance of calle law based On the principle of the binding force of 
precedents. 2 
II. THE RECEPTION OF ROMAN LAW 
A. rhl Continmtal SysttmS 
Historically, the continental systems grew mainly from the medieval 
Roman law. The substantive rules of these systems largely follow those of 
Justinian's law. The medieval dOctrine of ius communI allowed these rules to be 
applied directly and to supersede much of the original legal tradition of each 
nation. Even more important than this external reception was the adoption of 
the Bolognese legal method of the studium civil,. This method established the 
basic characteristics of the continental judicial systems, i.t., decision-making 
not on the baeis of Precedents but by way of subsuming a case under the terms 
of an abstractly formulated authoritative text or statute. 
The reception of Roman law into the continental legal systems took place in 
the following ways: 
First, the old, legally untrained jurors (SchOffm, Ichlvins, ,tc.), comparable 
1. Sn Wieacker, Zur Ale/utllisi"",,, tits rijmisch,n RICh/s, in 1 L'EUROPA E \L DlRITTO ROMANO: 
STUDlIN MEMOIlIA Dl PAOLO K08CHAKER 532 (D. Giuffre ed. Milan 1954). [This paper prelentl 
Profeuor Wieaclter', ideu with relpect to the role of Roman law in the modem world. Sn Part 
Two, S IV oftext, irifrrJ. S" /llso P. WIEACKER, PIlIVATIlECHTSGESCHICHTE DEll NEUZEIT 424 n.32 
(2d ed. 1967). Ed.) 
2. Here, for the .ake of brevity, I mUlt omit any reference to the Scandinavian legailYltem. 
This .y.tem occ\lpiel an independent po.ition, in many relpects, .between the two principal 
we.tern legal sy.tems. Further, the well-known similaritie. between the two Inain Iystem., i.I., 
the facton which make the code and the cue law Iystems approximate each other, mu.t a110 be 
neglected. 
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to the English jurymen, were gradually replaced by legally educated doctorls 
iuris civilis It canonici. At the same time, these doctorls became official servants of 
the sovereign in power. 
Second, these new "oracles of law," who held key positions in both the 
judicial and administrative branches of government, gave practical effect to a 
peculiar conception of Justinian's law. The conception had already become 
ideologically predominant in the Holy Roman Empire and subsequently 
became predominant in the western European kingdoms by means of the fic-
tion supmomn non rtcognosClrlS imp"ator 1st in tma sua [he who acknowledges no 
superior is emperor in his own land, ed.]. This conception was that the law of 
Justinian was ius commune, applicable everywhere in the absence of special 
regional sources of law (either traditional or statutory). 
Third, the individual customs or statutes (coutumls, ordonnanCls, Landrecht/!, 
StadtrlChte) and, later, the regional or national codes were reformed in accord-
ance with the Roman ius communI. 
B. Thl Common Law SystlmS 
The substantial reception of Justinian's law and the unrestricted dominance 
of the academically-trained jurist appointed by a sovereign did not, with cer-
tain exceptions, occur in the Anglo-American system. Accordingly, I shall not 
recount at this point the well-known details of this important development on 
the European continent. For an American audience interested in the impor-
tance of Roman law for the gm"a[ outlook of western legal thought, those 
elements of Roman law which were significant in the genesis of the Anglo-
American legal system are more important. That the doctrines of the 
glossators and even those of pre-Bolognese medieval Roman law influenced 
the intellectual organization of English common law, and especially equity, 
has been known since Vinogradoff and has been confirmed by recent 
research. s Common law and civil law did not wholly part company until after 
the Tudor periodj that is, not until after the Inns of Court had definitely 
prevailed over academic legal education in the preparation of barristers, 
sergeants-at-law and .iudges. 
The tradition of medieval Roman law had the following effects in England 
and in the former English colonies, including the United States of America: 
(1) In the twelfth century in England, such Italian scholars as Vacarius and, 
somewhat later, native English scholars, began teaching and using the legal 
literature of the first Bolognese glossators. The doctrines and teaching of 
Anglo-Norman law began to assume intellectually disciplined forms and con-
cepts at the same time. Glanvill's Tractatus de legibus et consuetudinibus regni 
3. P. VINOGRADOFF, ROMAN LAW IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE (1909, 3d ed. 1961). [For a survey of 
more recent work Stt Donahue, Till Civil Law in England, 84 YALE L..J. 167 (1974). Ed.] 
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Angli~ and, especially, Bracton's De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae5 are works 
of learned men trained in medieval Roman law. 
(2) Medieval canon law was a synthesis of ecclesiastical sources (such as Holy 
Scripture, the Fathers of the Church and the canons of ancient and medieval 
church councils) and of a medieval interpretation of Roman law. Canon law 
was applied in the medieval and early modern English church courts, whose 
wide jurisdiction included cases dealing with marriage, defamation, 
testaments and, in some periods, contracts. The chief and the members of the 
Court of Chancery were originally, and for a long time, clergymen. Conse-
quently, many rules of equity which developed in this court can be traced back 
to the aequitas canonica and thereby, partly, if not completely, to Roman law. 
(3) The separation of the Church of England from Rome diminished the im-
portance of the ecclesiastical administration of justice. Similarly, the fierce 
reaction of the lawyers of the Inns of Court stopped a newly incipient 
romanization of the common law in the Tudor period. However, the Court of 
Admiralty, the Star Chamber and the ecclesiastical courts continued to apply 
the principles of the civil law (i. e., a version of the ius commune) in decisions of 
maritime, penal and ecclesiastical matters. Civil law was also applied to ques-
tions of the conflict of laws and in certain other fields. 
(4) The close contacts between the Scots law and the continental ius commune, 
which lasted beyond the Union of 1705, are of perhaps minor importance in 
this context. The same may be said with respect to the incorporation of such 
civil law jurisdictions as Quebec and the countries of Roman-Dutch law (such 
as the Cape Colony, Ceylon and British Guyana) into the British Empire and, 
later, the Commonwealth. 
(5) On the other hand, a last wave of Roman law influenced the United 
States even more strongly than Blackstone's Great Britain and many countries 
of the European continent. I am referring to the enthusiastic acceptance in this 
country of the modern (i.e., "secularized" and rational) form of the law of 
nature of the early Enlightenment period. This form of natural law was at the 
bottom of American constitutional theory and its concept of the law of nations 
and of general jurisprudence. The doctrines of Grotius, Pufendorf, Barbeyrac 
and others were adopted by WiseS and his followers. This philosophy was in-
fluential in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and other colonies before and during 
the American Revolution to such an extent that the constitutional ideology of 
4. R. DE GLANVILL, THE TREATISE ON THE LAws AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND 
COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL (G. Hall trans. 1965). 
5. H. DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (G. Woodbine ed. S. Thorne 
trans. 1968). 
6. [John Wise (1652-1725) was a New England Congregational clergyman and opponent of 
British colonial gov,rnor, Sir Edmund Andros; his works include:· The Churches' (buzml Espoused 
(1710), A Vindication of the Government of New England Churches (1717), and A Word of Comfort to a 
Melancholy Country (1721). Ed.1 
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this country may be considered to have grown out of it. This form of natural 
law was based on the moral theology and philosophy of the Middle Ages which 
had beeD trarlsmitted by the late Spanish scholastics to Protestant north-
western Europe where it merged with the new scientific theory of Galileo, 
Descartes and Hobbes. This law, however, remained basically Roman law-
not so much in'its medieval version but, rather, in the elegant humanist inter-
pretation which the great French and Dutch jurists had given to it. Thus, to a 
continental observer, it seems that more Roman blood flows in the veins of the 
North American legal system than would be expected in light of the over-
powering independence, vitality and progressiveness of this system. 
N ow we should examine the relevanc~ that all of this has for us today to 
determine whether these historical developments enable us to understand 
modern law better. In order to do that, we should first consider the relevant 
characteristics of Roman law itself. 
III. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EFFECTS OF ROMAN LAW 
That we had to refer to "ancient" and "medieval" Roman law when we 
began suggests the necessary ambiguity of the expression "Roman law." I 
will briefly explain the meaning of these terms. 
The term "ancient Roman law" refers to the law of the Roman city-state 
and, later, to that of the ancient Roman empire. That law was an elemental 
phenomenon; it was an historical reality of great vital power. Ancient Roman 
law was at one time the living law of a powerful community. 
The term "medieval Roman law" (as well as all other forms of Roman law) 
refers to a tradition, i. e., to the vital effects certain surviving facts, or 
authoritative texts, of antiquity had on the life, society and legal systems of the 
medieval and modern Western world. Whether these new societies understood 
these surviving elements in their "proper" sense is not important. "Prolific 
misunderstanding" is a typical and perhaps necessary factor in the process of 
appropriating another civilization. 7 What I am rt}ferring to is simply the 
distinction between two specific objects of historical writing. On the one side, 
there is the reality of the ancient Roman world. On the other side, there is the 
conception which the jurists, historians and philologists of successive epochs 
had of this reality. I will illustrate this with a simple example: The well-known 
maxim princeps legibus solutus (meaning the Roman emperor himself is not 
bound by the law) can have at least three different meanings. According to the 
Roman jurist Ulpian (approximately 220 A.D.), its originator, it meant that 
7. Some modern German philosophers have proposed the suggestive term "Wirkungsgschichte" 
r roughly, "the history of effects," ed.] to describe those secondary effects of past events. But I 
shall not deal with the far-reaching implications of distinguishing, in this way, the primary ex-
istence and the secondary effects of historical phenomena in ontological, theological and even 
historical hermeneutics. 
262 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW R~:VlJo:w [Vol. IV. No.2 
the emperor was exempt from a specific statute which disadvantaged unmar-
ried or childless citizens. 8 In the Pand,cts of Justinian, three hundred years 
later, the statement acquired a more general meaning. There, it was placed 
under the general title Dll,gibus senatusque consultis It longa consultudin,.9 In this 
context, the statement should be understood to mean that the emperor is ex-
empt from all statutes. to In the philosophy of European absolutism, this 
paroemia finally came to be the justification of the principle that the sovereign 
is not bound by law at all. 
IV. THE RELEVANT CHARACTERISTICS OF ANCIENT ROMAN LAW 
The remainder of this part of my lecture will be devoted to ancient Roman 
law. I will restrict myself to those elements which came to have a lasting mean-
ing for western civilization and western legal th?ught. The lasting effect 
Roman law had on world history may be explained by: (1) the incorporation 
of the Mediterranean ecumene into one empire, which survived spiritually in 
modern Europe; (2) the Roman concept of political power as a legal order; (3) 
the strict isolation of this legal order from its social and economic background; 
and (4) the control of legal deoision-making by means of a consistent system of 
cognitive principles. 
Roman law and Roman jurisprudence are products of an ancient city-state. 
No other ancient city-state, however, produced a positive legal science or a 
legal system of equivalent significance. The lasting effects of Roman law mUlt, 
therefore, be the result of certain unique conditions that prevailed only in the 
Roman city-state - their civitas or rIS publica, as they called it. 
A. Th, Autarchic Roman Polis 
The phenomenon of the ancient polis is principally confined to the occiden-
tal, Mediterranean cultures. The polis was Greek, Italo-Etruscan and western 
Semitic, i.e., Phoenician (Tyre, Sidon, Arados, Ite.) or Punic (Carthage, 
Utica, Ite.). The archetype is the Greek polis, and Athens is the one we know 
best. To us, the polis is a remarkable and singular political organism. The 
polis was a baSically agrarian community of landlords and peasants, cut off 
from the surrounding world by its city walls. Inside, there was generally a 
8. These legal disadvantages were a part of Augustus's program of "Moral Rearmament." 
The emperor, due to obvious dyna.tic grounds of expediency, was impliedly exempt from this 
.tatute, according to Ulpian. It is only consistent that Ulpian added: : 'the wife of Caesar is, 
however, not exempted." 
9. DIG2ST OF jlJSTINIAN 1.3. 
10. At least jUltinlan'. compilen are honeat enough not to conceal the old, more restricted 
context of this Itatement. The compilers, in DIGEST OF jlJSTINIAN 1.3.32, do cite the original 
lource: Ulpia"w lib", Irtdlcimo ad I"",. Iuli.". " Papia"., i.,., Ulpian'. thirteenth book on the 
matrimonial Itatute. of Augustul. 
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temple of the city deity, a citadel (~/Cp67t'OAt~, arx) and a market place (~'(op~, 
forum). The polis was an autarchic unit in three ways: (1) with respect to 
religion, the polis was a sacred precinct for its deities, i.e., Athena Promachos 
or Jupiter Optimus Maximus; (2) the relationship of the polis to the rest of the 
world was defined by the absence of foreign rule ( iAeu6eptcc ) and by the 
freedom to lay down its own laws ( ~uTovo(J.i~ ); and (3) the internal structure of 
the polis was determined by its quality as a community of free men, i. e., men 
who, enjoying full political rights, were all subject to the same law ( to"ovo(J.i~ ). 
This principle did not exclude slavery, however, nor did it mean that there 
was no gradation of political rights according to economic status (census). 
In the fully developed polis, the constitution of the city and the legal rela-
tions among the citizens ( VO(J.O~ &o"Tt/C6~ , ius civile) were based on statutes. 
These statutes could either be the result of an act of "codification" by a 
nomothete who had been nominated by the city and vested with extraordinary 
powers (such as Solon or the Roman decemvirz), or it could be resolutions of the 
popular assemblies (i/C/CA'tlO"i~ , comitia) , as later became the rule. Similarly, 
leading officials (&pXOVte~ , magistratus) were elected by voting assemblies. Im-
portant legal issues were also resolved directly by the citizens' assemblies. 
Other matters were presented to large juries, and cases of minor importance 
may have been decided by single jurors. 
"Law" in the developed polis was not conceived of as a divine gift or an im-
memorial custom, but rather as a man-made, autonomous institution. This 
conception played an important role in the formation of western legal thought; 
it was the beginning of a notion of a state founded in the free will of its citizens. 
The strongest impulse for the development of this conception came from the 
necessity of defense. Defense required a heavily armed infantry (cp~A(X'(r.. 
class is) which replaced - or, rather, pushed into the background - the old 
feudal cavalry. Consequently, this newly important infantry began to make 
political demands. As a result of these demands, the old tribal kingdoms, or 
feudal aristocracies, evolved into poleis. 
B. The Roman Nobility and the Expansion of the Roman Polis 
The general structures of the Greek polis are also characteristic of the 
Roman res publica from the fourth century B.C. Of all the poleis, however, 
Rome had three distinguishing features which led to the uniqueness of Roman 
law in world history. One element was of an external nature: the military suc-
cess which brought this polis alone from a hegemonial position in an Italic con-
federation to a position as the ruling power in the Mediterranean world. 
Without this achievement, Roman law would naturally have failed to have 
historical importance lasting into modern times; and the legal systems and the 
science of law in the West would not be what they are today. 
A second element was the way in which the Roman res publica deviated from 
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the regular model of the Greek polis, Economic and social changes in Greece 
frequently led to the development of democracy with full equality of all 
citizens. This development was cut off in Rome. On the other hand, unlike 
other great commercial city-states, such as Carthage or Massilia, the Roman 
res publica did not become, or remain, a closed oligarchy either. Both extremes 
were avoided by a happy compromise struck between the old patrician 
aristocracy and the rising upper stratum of the plebs. At first, the upper 
stratum of the plebs allied themselves with the economically endangered 
smaller landlords and with the landless population of the city. This alliance 
threatened to upset the old patrician state. But, the fusion of the patriciate and 
the leading plebe an families resulted in the stabilization of a new aristocracy. 
This so-called nobilitas led Rome in the next two centuries to dominance in the 
Mediterranean world. At the same time, the establishment of the plebe an 
tribunate and the integration of the concilia plebis into the constitutional 
framework, the democratization of the census and the popular election of the 
magistrates quieted the remaining lower stratum of the plebs. In this unusual, 
but very successful manner, "populistic" elements were blended with an old 
oligarchy. The magistrates were thus put under supervision, and the state was 
saved from usurpation by tyrants - a constant threat for most Greek poleis. 
On the other hand, the Roman nobility kept its ability to overcome internal 
and external setbacks - a typical virtue of a tradition-minded leading caste. 
The annual elections of the magistrates, who took seats in the Senate after 
finishing their term of office, brought about a constant "changing of the 
guard. " At the same time, the Senate provided the res publica with a virtually 
inexhaustible reserve of experienced statesmen, military commanders and 
public administrators. 
The third unique element of the Roman polis was the way in which this 
Roman nobility developed unprecedented methods of military, political and 
economic expansion during its classical period. A network of Roman and 
Latin settlements (coloniae) made possible the expansion of the city-state into 
vast regions. These settlements were independent in their sources of 
livelihood. With respect to the law, however, they remained sectors of the 
parent city, although they were geographically distant. Thus, the ground was 
laid for the urbanization and Romanization of the Iberian, Celtic, Germanic 
and Illyrian provinces which were to become the birthplaces of early medieval 
Europe. 
C. The Unique Institutions of Roman Law 
The traditionalism, realism and authoritative attitude of the Roman nobili-
ty were the sources of the peculiarities of Roman law. Rome was the first poli-
ty to develop an independent and highly objective procedure to arbitrate social 
and economic conflicts. This development liberated the Roman legal system 
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from archaic ritualism and, later, kept it free from the too-immediate impact 
of changing political and moral ideologies. 
One should emphasize that this development is, perhaps, the primary 
Roman contribution to western legal thought. The Roman contribution con-
sists principaJly in the development of highly objective methods of conflict-
resolution, not in the discovery of the concept of law as such nor in the reduc-
tion of law to general conditions and qualities of justice. These latter 
developments are glorious achievements of the Greek spirit. The Greeks' 
discovery and refinement of the concept of law was, of course, known to the 
Roman jurists, and it did indeed influence Roman legal thought after the sec-
ond century B.C. Through Roman legal texts, these Greek achievements had 
considerable effect on European legal thought, as well. But the singular con-
tribution of Rome to legal culture did not consist of this. This point requires 
some explanation, brief though it must be, because it is not obvious: 
(1) In contrast to the role legislation played in the Greek poleis, Roman 
legislation remained somewhat' 'underdeveloped." In times of constitutional 
crisis, legislation was used by the conflicting parties to advance their position 
or it was used as a means of effecting a compromise. In matters of social con-
cern, legislation was intended to bring about reforms or merely to appease the 
masses. In the field of private law, legislation was of minor importance - for-
tunately, one should like to say. Thus, legal progress was protected from the 
intrigues of the nobility, the demagoguery of the tribunes or of their promoters 
and the emotions of the metropolitan masses which so often corrupted Greek 
statutes. 
(2) In a similar manner, the Roman constitution succeeded in protecting 
the administration of civil justice from misuse for political purposes. Large 
juries, or even the comitia themselves, were competent to try only exceptional 
civil cases, those of special political or social importance. Despite the dangers 
inherent in having only men of the senatorial class mete out justice, 11 this 
system proved beneficial to the continuity and security of private law. The 
speeches of the great Attic orators and of Cicero are evidence of how 
dangerous the emotionalism and the persuasiveness of rhetoric would have 
been to the justice of a decision. 
(3) The place of legislation and of trial by popular courts in the field of 
private law was taken by a uniquely Roman institution, the praetor. One of 
the annually elected magistrates, the praetor supervised the decision-making 
of private judges (iudices privati). The praetor had coercive power to enforce 
judicial measures, i.e., to issue summonses or subpoenas, to appoint trial 
judges or to grant execution by a judgment creditor. The praetor did not, 
11. Only men of the senatorial class had this responsibility prior to the crisis of the Republic, 
i. e., in its last century. 
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however, hand down judgments himself. Instead, he appointed private judges 
and vested them with the authority to collect evidence and to decide the case in 
accordance with his instructions (formulae). 12 At the beginning of the praetor's 
year of office, he informed the public of his intentions and procedural pro-
grams by an edict. 13 
From the time of the later Republic, the praetor was no longer bound by 
statu tory forms of action (legis actiones); he could devise procedural Jormulae for 
individual cases and include them in his general edict. Such measures were 
not restricted to the application oflaws in force, but could be used to modify or 
replace existing law. When the praetor's successors adopted such innovations, 
as they did more often than not, the result was substantially the creation of 
new law (ius honorarium). 
The tendency of these innovations was often similar to that of English equi-
ty. They were essentially progressive; like English equity, in contrast to the 
common law, the ius honorarium was likely to support ethical and technical 
change. As Max Weber observed, Amtscharisma (the charisma of an official) is 
more likely to tend toward social and moral innovation than traditionalistic 
judicature. Thus, the praetor eliminated, or reduced, the effect of antiquated 
rituals of the ius civile. He protected both minors and adults from cheating, in-
timidation or undue influence. He set up new ethical standards in bonaeJidei 
iudicia. Similarly, he adapted the sluggish law of an agrarian tribal society to 
new needs of commerce. This development was necessitated by the advanced 
contract and credit system of the Hellenistic economy which Rome entered 
and finally absorbed after the third century B.C. Important innovations of the 
praetorian edicts were intended to serve the banking and credit system, a more 
highly specialized system of production and maritime commerce. 
Although the praetor thus played an active part in "keeping the 
bloodstream in the body" of. ancient Roman law, he was essentially 
uninterested in the intellectual and scientific development of law. Most 
praetors were ambitious competitors for the consulate, the highest office of the 
res publica. They were not, as a rule, legal experts, and some may have been 
legally illiterate. The experienced, and possibly able, clerks (apparitores) of the 
praetor's staff, who served beyond the one-year term of office, could not 
relieve the praetor from the burden of his creative tasks. Who was it, then, 
who showed the praetor the techniques by which he could realize his inten-
tions? And especially, who suggested the innovativeJormulae? As one might ex-
pect, the responsibility for these advances belongs in large part to a group of 
legal experts. This brings us to the essence of Rome's contribution to all subse-
12. The formulae of the praetors have been compared to the Anglo·Saxon writs, in spite of 
essential differences in origins and functions. 
13. This "edict" was known as the edict urn praetoris or the so·called edictum perpetuum. 
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quent legal thought, i. e., the iuris consultus, the professional Roman jurist - a 
phenomenon almost unknown to the Greek world. 
(4) The Roman jurists were a unique type oflegal functionary. They were 
neither legislators nor judges; neither advocates nor prosecutors. They per-
formed their crucial tasks as advisers without being public officials; their ex-
pertise was not tainted by the receipt of a payment. They could not have 
played their role if they had not enjoyed great social and intellectual prestige 
because the development and the improvement of the private law was almost 
completely in their hands. The social prestige of the Republican jurists derived 
from their membership in the ruling class of the nobilitas; this also made them 
economically independent and allowed them to work gratis. Nevertheless, 
these activities were rewarding in that they were a means of obtaining the 
favor (gratia) of the voting population. Thus, their chances to be elected to the 
higher magistracies were improved and election further helped them to main-
tain their public influence. The professional authority of the Roman jurists 
came from their monopoly of information and technical expertise. They alone 
were endowed with the highly specialized knowledge necessary to command 
the formalistic and traditionalistic ius civile. 14 
(5) The legal "monopoly" of the Roman jurists can be traced back to their 
original membership in the body of pontiffs (collegium pontificum). The pQntifices 
were at one time the guardians of all written tradition and ritual techniques. 
The pontiffs alone knew all the laws, the forms of' 'writs" and documents, the 
court calendar and the responsa15 which their predecessors had rendered 
earlier. In a traditionalistic society like old Rome, the dread of error concern-, 
ing sacred or legal matters made the pontiffs indispensable. As time went on, 
an increasing number of nobiles turned to the practice of giving legal advice 
without being members of the collegium pontificum and a large part of the 
prestige of the pontificate passed to them. In addition, their greater in-
dependence from the directives of the pontifex maximus gave this new group 
greater liberties and greater flexibility. 
(6) The last characteristic feature of ancient Roman law is that new law was 
created by giving legal advice (consilia, responsa) in contrast to the European 
way of creating law by legislation and the Anglo-American way of doing it by 
judicial decision. In this extremely closed society, the public actions both of 
private persons and of magistrates required the constant social backing of 
political, religious or legal authority. One might, for example, consult an 
14. The ius civile of the time of the Roman jurists was similar, in these respects, to the common 
law of bygone times - and maybe not only of bygone times. 
15. fA technical term, virtually untranslatable, for authoritatIve opinions given by a pontiff or 
jurist. Ed.] 
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oracle. In legal matters, one consulted the oracles of the law (oracula iun·s), the 
jurists, who offered counsel (consilium). The consilium was used to determine 
the appropriate form of action (agere) or the appropriate document for a trans-
action (cavere) or - in its noblest form - to frame a legal opinion (respondere) 
addressed to the praetor, a private judge (iudex privatus) or a client. By means 
of these advisory activities, the Roman jurist maintained constant contact with 
actual cases. The fact that legal development came out of actual cases makes 
ancient Roman law much more like Anglo-American law than the practice of 
deducing law from statutes (continental legalism) or from scientific legal con-
cepts (as in the BegriJfsjurisprudenz of German Pandectism). 
(7) A unique quality of Roman jurisprudence is that it did not stop at a 
purely pragmatic and precise casuistry. On the contrary, the greatest achieve-
ment of the Roman jurists was their ability to "purify" the case of its acciden-
tal elements, of the species facti and, thus, to specify the essential legal problem 
as a quaestio iuris. The first occasion to do this was presented by the disputatio 
fori, i.e., the discussion held by the older jurist, who had been asked for a con-
silium, with his apprentices. This later developed into legal instruction and was 
finally set down in a legal literature. Under these conditions, legal science and 
literature were molded out of their original raw material; they were derived 
from the simple nature of the formulae and responsa which had been honed by 
practical experience, sorted and recorded. In this way, the decisions of a new 
science were reduced to common denominators, and the literary presentation 
of its professional knowledge became rationalized. A process of intellectual 
reasoning and the evolution of general propositions had begun. 
The part that Greek theory of the formation of scientific concepts and 
systems played in the evolution of Roman legal science is controversial. Many 
of us believe it was of considerable importance, but not the deciding impulse. 
However, I cannot go into more detail on this question. The modern jurist, 
though, should be heedful of Scylla and Charybdis. He should not, especially 
as a European professor, imagine Roman jurisprudence as the model of a 
systematic or even axiomatic theory - as the law-of-nature school or the 
Pandektenwissenschaft was, for example. Similarly, he should not see it as a 
merely pragmatic, unprincipled case law or believe that Roman decision-
making was based only on free and creative intuition. 
v. CONCLUSION OF PART ONE 
In summary, all the factors that contributed to the glory and uniqueness of 
Roman jurisprudence for ages to come were present in the iuris consultus of the 
late Republic; the characteristic institutions, norms and concepts of this legal 
system were already developed at that time. The further development of 
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Roman private law between the early imperial period and the J ustinianic 
codification was only a consequential result of those inherent elements. Admit-
tedly, the codification was a unique and enriching development which 
gloriously overshadowed the older material from which it was made. For our 
present purposes, however, a short outline of the later developments will suf-
fice: 
(1) Our knowledge of Roman law is based almost exclusively on the 
"classical" legal literature of the Principate (first to third centures A.D.). As 
far as we can tell, this literature is far richer and on a higher intellectual level 
than were the lost works of the Republican era. 
(2) Classical jurisprudence absorbed all the questions which had arisen in 
the time of the late Republic. These questions were categorized, and often 
adequately answered for the first time, in the classical era. These questions 
were also enriched by the emergence of new issues. Undeniably, Roman 
jurisprudence came to its height at this time. It would only be nostalgic snob-
bery to deny that the Roman jurisprudence now had come to its height - just 
as it would be wrong not to trace this climax back to its older origins. 
(3) The greatest jurists took a direct part in governmental tasks and the cen-
tral imperial administration of justice from the time of the great adopted 
emperors of the second century A.D. Thus, the whole empire was within their 
area of interest. Responsibilities such as these liberated the jurist from city-
state prejudices. Consequently, their sense of lawfulness was allowed to 
develop freely, and they were disciplined to care for the welfare of their im-
perial subjects. 
(4) In the same spirit, the jurists assisted the emperors in the development of 
a new administrative law for the empire. This body of ius publicum novum was 
institutionalized and made more humanitarian by these jurists - perhaps one 
of their greatest achievements. Through the medium of Justinian's codifica-
tion, this benigna interpretatio gave the leaven of moral reason and common 
sense to the European ius commune, the ius canonicum and English equity. 
(5) The survival of this great legacy was not prevented by the catastrophes 
of the later third century A.D. or by the Byzantine absolutism which began 
with Constantine the Great. To be sure, further imperial legislation became 
more of a manifestation of the woes of an empire which was under stress and 
partly dying - perhaps this legislation was the darkest and most oppressive 
legacy of ancient Roman law. This last epoch may boast, however, of one very 
different achievement: Byzantine legal science and the Justinianic codification 
which this new science made possible. Thus, the jurists of the Byzantine 
period rescued the bulk of Roman law and, in fact, they conveyed its most 
superior version, the Roman classical jurisprudence, to the new European 
era. 
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Part Two: The Nature and Significance of Medieval Roman Law 
I. THE SECONDARY EFFECTS OF EARLIER CULTURES 
A. The Problem of Cultural lrifluence 
To aid our understanding of the effects of ancient Roman law on western 
civilization, let me offer a few preliminary thoughts on the ways in which an 
historian views the secondary effects of an earlier culture on a later one. 
Historians cannot avoid generalizing about this phenomenon. The in-
numerable social and psychological processes by which cultural structures are 
carried over from one era to another cannot be described individually. To 
discuss this phenomenon at all, we must systematize the ways in which it oc-
curs. The simplest concepts, such as "influence" or "impact," are harmless 
but rather meaningless. For example, the proposition: "A has influenced B" 
means only that the fact "B" has been conditioned in some way by the fact 
"A." Equally harmless and meaningless is the metaphor of legal succession, 
i. e.} the proposition that the continental concept of the legal obligation is a 
Roman legacy. When the metaphor of biological descent is employed, the ef-
fect is more dangerous - implying that a new civilization can inherit 
characteristics from a parent civilization in the same way in which a child 
receives hereditary characteristics from its parents. In this case, the metaphor 
is ambiguous and misleading. In fact, individuals in a new civilization may be 
the biological descendants of individuals of the older civilization; but "the 
spirit wafts from where it wills" and may at times favor the sons of Hagar and 
not the legitimate children of Isaac. 
When historians apply more complex patterns in their attempt to com-
prehend generally the relationships between two civilizations, the danger of 
unintended implication is even stronger. These dangers are evident in such 
metaphorical expressions as "a new culture learns from the parent culture"; or 
in speaking of the "continuity" or "survival" of an older cultural element; or 
in referring to the "renaissance"or the "revival" of past cultural hypostatiza-
tions in new cultures. 16 These three models of historical expression, should be 
discussed further so that the misunderstanding caused by their use can be bet-
ter understood. 
At first sight, the most realistic model for conceptualizing the relationship 
between temporally separate cultures appears to be that of "learning." In 
much the same way as a pupil learns behavioral patterns or acquires informa-
16. The term "reception" will not be used here as it frequently is used to describe the adop-
tion of the Roman law of antiquity in southern Europe in the early Middle Ages or its adoption in 
northern Europe at a somewhat later time. I believe that the term "reception" is most properly 
confined to the adoption by one legal order of the existing order of a contemporary legal system, 
e.g., Turkey's "reception" of the Swiss Civil Code. 
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tion by observing a teacher, "the" early Middle Ages are thought to be pupils 
of' 'the" late antiquity. Leaving aside the fact that no teacher living in late an-
tiquity ever taught an individual pupil living in the Middle Ages, this idea 
seems quite appropriate when speaking, e.g., of handicrafts, Roman hor-
ticulture or glass fabrication. Similarly, we may speak of learning when we 
refer to the adoption of the seven-day or the planetary week, the script, the 
form of legal deeds, and perhaps, even the simpler legal institutions oflate an-
tiquity, such as earnest money (arra) in a sale. The more complex a cultural 
phenomenon, however, the more its assimilation requires intellectual produc-
tiveness on the part of the "pupil," and the more unsatisfactory is this model 
of the simple transfer of information. The further developments in the Middle 
Ages of the Christology of late antiquity, or of the Neoplatonic teaching on 
categories, are two forbidding examples of extremely complex processes. No 
less complicated was the process of adopting a legal ideology or a legal scien-
tific method. 
When an historian speaks of continuity (or survival), he is postulating, rather 
arbitrarily, that a certain cultural factor has remained constant. Thus, the 
cultural factor is said to have retained its identity despite the flow of time. 
Whatever specific surviving element the historian chooses,17 its identity with 
the past element is, at best, only an initial working hypothesis. Thus, one can-
not simply claim that the Roman municipal constitution more or less survived 
in the form of similar (but not identical) constitutions in the early medieval 
cities; one must prove it. 
Lastly, there is the concept of rebirth, revival or renaissance, so popular among 
cultural historians. Since the time of the Italian rinascimento, the sublime 
paradigm of the rebirth of those redeemed by Jesus Christ has given this im-
age its very special splendor. At the same time, it is a most imprecise analogy. 
For the exact description of a very complex and diffuse interplay, it substitutes 
the mystery of the pentecostal miracle - the pouring forth of the Holy Spirit, 
so to speak. "Nevertheless, the comparison certainly thrives, not only because 
of its inner nobility, but also in response to the pal able experience of 
historians. The encounter between a new culture and an old one may indeed 
be characterized as such a phenomenon. Such an encounter may in fact lead to 
a real spiritual initiation or initial "ignition" through which productive struc-
tures or ideologies may catch fire through the contact with the remains of a 
past civilization. 
Thus, "survival," "continuity," "revival," "renaissance" and even the 
17. Sometimes the individuals of former cultures are considered the persevering element, 
when we speak, for example, of "Celtic" or "Iberian" continuity. At other times, the reference 
is to an objective phenomenon, when we speak, for example, of the continuity of the ancient form 
of a deed, or of the Roman municipal constitution, or, sometimes, even of the Roman law itself as 
a whole. 
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modest "learning" are not precise and documentable propositions concerning 
the interaction of social and psychological elements and effects. The historian 
cannot do without them, however, for two reasons. First, these models have a 
legitimate purpose; they provide working hypotheses, or tentative' 'sketches," 
for the explication of facts in the context of scientific research. Second, these 
models provide an indispensable means of communicating the results of 
research. The models should, however, remain as flexible as possible. Modern 
genetics may offer the most appropriate model for describing the means by 
which past elements are reproduced in a new civilization. As I understand it, 
genetics describes the passing of hereditary factors as a process of conveying 
information. Living beings are defined by a code - a biochemical matrix -
according to which similar forms are reproduced. This pattern probably cor-
responds best to the legal historian's perception of the secondary effects of 
Roman law on the Middle Ages. 
B. The Two Phases of Roman Law in the Middle Ages 
These complicated reflections were necessary because the continuing ex-
istence of ancient Roman law in the western societies represents an especially 
complex and ambiguous process of transference. Legal systems are all-
encompassing, psychological, social and intellectual structures. Legal systems 
are complexes of several elements, including social customs and behavioral 
patterns, organized social institutions, techniques of using public power, 
moral or ideological values and intellectual processes of perception. 
In order to give an overview of the secondary effects of ancient Roman law, 
it is best to treat these effects in two phases. First, in the Early Middle Ages 
(fifth to tenth centuries), we have the immediate, continuing existence of 
Roman legal principles and institutions. Second, in the High Middle Ages 
(from the eleventh century onwards), we have the rediscovery of classical 
Roman legal science by the southern European law faculties. The cognitive 
models of "learning" and "survival" can be said to belong to the first phase, 
while the term "renaissance" belongs to the second phase. The second phase, 
or renaissance, was followed in countries north of the Alps by the so-called 
"reception" of the reborn legal science. 18 
These two eras represent different degrees of intellectual maturity in 
western civilization. In the Early Middle Ages, western civilization was still 
incapable of expressing its own identity and ideals; it was restricted to 
assimilating disparate antique elements. After the revival of the eleventh cen-
tury, however, western civilization had matured to the point where it was 
capable of congenial and creative confrontation with the legacy of Roman 
classical jurisprudence, because it had created its own theological philosoph-
ical and political ideology. 
18. See note 16 supra. 
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II. ROMAN LAW IN EARLY MEDIEVAL EUROPE 
A. Tire First Western European States 
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In western Europe, the earliest organizations resembling the modern state 
grew out of. the collapse of the western Roman Empire: the Visigothic and 
Burgundian kingdoms within a still-existing Empire and the later and more 
promising Frankish kingdom in the northwestern territories of the former Em-
pire. The Frankish Empire was also responsible for having forced the Roman 
inheritance upon the Germanic tribes of the European interior (such as the 
Alemannians, the Bavarians and, finally, the Saxons) and upon the western 
Slavic peoples. Later, the Franks exported the Roman inheritance to the Scan-
dinavians as well. England - due to the high intellectual and spiritual stand-
ard of her clergy - had her own special standing in this process. 
These "states" were able to constitute themselves only by taking advantage 
of the surviving Roman administrative organization. The Empire from which. 
they arose, however, was no longer the principate, the Empire which the prin-
cipes, from the time of Augustus, had forged on the base of the old Roman 
Republic. Instead, the new European communities succeeded to the 
"dominate," the absolutistic and centralized monarchy which was shaped by 
the catastrophies of the third century and which ruled thereafter over a society 
in which horizontal class divisions were suppressed and vertical divisions 
enhanced. 
A hierarchical and highly specialized bureaucracy was an instrument of 
constant tyrannical intervention by a thoroughly regimented state. The main 
purpose of the state had become the securing of the finances and military serv-
ices necessary for its defense and, thus, the preservation of the bureaucracy 
itself. To accomplish these ends, the once-free tenants (colom) were bound to 
their land, and the huge manorial estates were feudalized. All crafts which 
were relevant to the public interest were transformed into hereditary, com-
pulsory guilds. Of greatest importance, the economic productivity of the 
wealthier classes in the cities, which was once the backbone of the Empire's 
welfare, was sacrificed to a ruthless system of taxes, services and requisitions 
(munera publica). 
B. The Legal Literature Which Influenced Early Medieval Europe 
In order to survive, the new Roman-Germanic societies had to continue 
managing within the existing bureaucratic structures. These included the laws 
and decrees of the late Empire. This "immaterial baggage" had, however, 
shrunk considerably in the interim between the fall of the Empire and the 
establishment of the western kingdoms. By far, the most important legal 
sources in the Early Middle Ages were the enactments of the Byzantine 
emperors together with some relics or epitomes of elementary legal literature. 
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These epitomes included an excerpt from an elementary legal handbook 
dating from around 300 A.D. (the Sententiae Pault); a crude adaptation of 
Gaius' famous textbook (the Epitome Gal); various late commentaries orignat-
ing from the elementary instruction of provincial functionaries 
(interpretationes); and, lastly, a few collections of specimen deeds. 19 The law 
contained in this meager assortment is referred to as "Roman vulgar law." 
Nevertheless, the command of even these humble leftovers required the 
mastery of some basic intellectual skills. Included among these skills were 
reading and writing, the organization and preservation of documents, and the 
drafting of statutes, court decisions, protocols (gesta, acta), wills and contracts 
of sale. These skills could only be passed on to a new generation where antique 
elementary education, especially the trivium (grammar, logic and rhetoric), 
had been preserved. Only those who were taught in these schools were literate 
and, thus, capable of writing down the statutes, administrative acts and deci-
sions that were necessary to establish an organizational framework for the new 
communities. 
Thus, those who were literate possessed a monopoly of all those positions in 
government, secular and ecclesiastical administration and the administration 
of justice which required the ability to read and to write and to perform basic 
bureaucratic tasks. These literates, in other words, had the exclusive control of 
the drafting of laws and of all records concerning accounting, taxes and fees 
and control of all those transactions which required notarization either for 
reasons of expediency or because notarization was legally required. While the 
leading literates and functionaries were originally recruited from the class of 
Roman provincial landlords (possessores), most of whom had senatorial rank, 
these tasks were ultimately left almost entirely to the higher functionaries of 
the Church. These churchmen became the backbone of the new Roman-
Germanic states after the extinction of paganism and Arianism. 
C. Fundamental Roman Legal Concepts in Early Medieval Europe 
Of prime importance in this discussion are the ideas of law and state which 
were adopted in early medieval Europe along with the basic intellectual skills. 
These ideas were to play an essential role in the forming of western Europe. 
One influential idea was the Roman concept of public office (in the sense of 
organized authority) with its corresponding functional competencies. The per-
manent administrative body, first established by the classical principes, had 
been enlarged by the absolute monarchy into a hypertrophic bureaucracy. 
19. [Convenient editions of the Sententiae Pauli and the Epitome Gai, and some of the other 
works mentioned may be found in 2 FONTES IURIS ROMANI ANTJo:JUSTINIANI 0. Baviera ed. 
1968). For the English-speaking reader the best edition ofGaius's Institutes, his famous textbook, 
is 1-2 THE INSTITUTES OF GAlUS (F. de Zulueta ed. 1953). Ed.] 
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The Germanic conception of office as a personal relationship between the 
vassal and the king left little room for either an objective concept of public of-
fice or for the consequent development of set competencies. Thus, the only 
models for the latter type of organization available to the early medieval states 
were to be found in the imperial administration or in the ecclesiastical office 
organized on similar lines. 
A similar process took place with the concept of statutory law. The Germanic 
tribes did not originally perceive law as a volitional act of free men, as did the 
ancient city-states, or as an imperative act of the ruler, as did Rome under the 
emperors. To the Germanic tribes, law was conceived of as a body of unwrit-
ten customs and traditions. All written law in the Early Middle Ages, 
therefore, must have been based on the absolutistic notion of law developed in 
the late principate and the Byzantine monarchy. The Germanic kings" 
however, for the sake of their own tribesmen, formally maintained the idea 
that the laws were made by the great men of the realm (proceres, etc.) and only 
drafted and promulgated by the king's staff. 
Beyond the ideas of public office and statute law, the Church made the Ear-
ly Middle Ages conscious of a universal concept oj law. For the Christians unified 
under the Roman Empire, the powerful tradition of ius romanum evidently ex-
isted above and beyond the old tribal laws and the decrees of the new rulers. 
This universal law was connected by Augustine with the idea of the ius 
divinum; it remained a powerful living idea and continued to guide the 
thoughts and public actions of the literate staffs of the new rulers. 
The carryover of political, literary and legal traditions from late antiquity to 
the Early Middle Ages remained for a long time only a sign of survival and not 
a revival. In many respects, what we refer to as the early medieval "states" 
were not much more than provinces which had outlived the fallen Empire. 
They were not new, original creations which had adopted the norms and in-
stitutions of a former world by their own free choice. 
III. ROMAN LAW IN THE HIGH MIDDLE AGES AND IN 
EARLY MODERN EUROPE 
A. The Studium Civile 
The western world did not begin to comprehend its own "identity" before 
the eleventh century. This process of comprehension was brought about by the 
emergence of new ideologies among the ruling ecclesiastical elite. In the reli-
gious sector, this new ideology took shape in the reform movement of Cluny. 
In the political sector, the process occurred through the idea of translatio and 
renovatio imperii. Finally, in the intellectual sector, the new ideology followed 
the reception of the new Platonic and Aristotelian dialectics by the early 
scholastics. In the sphere oflegal thinking, this process found expression in the 
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rediscovery, in a spiritual more than a literal sense, of the great heritage of the 
Roman classical jurists which had been collected inJustinian's Digest, study of 
which was revived by the end of the eleventh century. The European science 
of law evolved from this rediscovery, and that science formed the basis of the 
legal systems of modern continental Europe. 
The studium civile blossomed in Bologna around the beginning of the twelfth 
century. Soon afterwards, the phenomenon appeared in other Italian and 
French cities. One must ask, what led to this unique intellectual explosion? 
One prerequisite to the establishment of the studium civile was a political 
ideology, the so-called "Rome-Idea." The "Rome-Idea" was expressed in 
three versions. One was the imperial idea of the Hohenstaufen emperors and 
their rivals among the monarchs of western Europe. A second was the curial 
concept of the reform popes after Cluny. A third was the national version of 
the Italian city republics. In all three forms, the "Rome-Idea" encouraged a 
general recognition of Justinian's law. 
Also favoring the establishment of the studium civile was a new scholarly en-
thusiasm for the texts of antiquity. This scholarly enthusiasm had captured the 
scholastics and was echoed in the Latin literature of the High Middle Ages. 
Finally, there was the impact of economic expansion in northern Italy. This 
expansion required a rationalization of legal intercourse and legal conflicts 
which could be accomplished through rules which had been made more 
predictable by a professional systematization. Significantly, the studium civile 
was established in Bologna by order of the municipal authorities. 
B. The First European Jurists 
Under these conditions, the instructional method of the liberal arts (trivium) 
which was used in schooling the clergy, the secular consules and sindici, the 
difensores and the notaries was now applied to Justinian's Digest. In so doing, 
the Bolognese fathers of legal science discovered a complete new spiritual 
world. They became aware of the unique, free and superior mastership of the 
great Roman jurists. One of the wonders of our civilization is that the 
Bolognese glossators responded to the challenge of the Roman jurists with an 
understanding of equal rank. Their understanding was not historical, but they 
showed the same ability to assimilate their material that the school of Chartres 
showed with Plato, or Thomas Aquinas showed with Aristotle. For the 
Bolognese jurists Justinian's Digest was not a mass oflifeless texts. They made 
the timeless problems the texts posed their own concern. 
These glossators became Europe's first jurists in the strictest sense. They 
did not deal with social conflicts merely within the bounds of accepted tradi-
tion or the dictates of moral ideology. Instead, they dealt with social conflicts 
by discussing each case as an independent juridical problem, as only the 
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Roman jurists had done before. 20 Thenceforth, there was in Europe a third 
authority tq rival the actual political powers and the spiritual authority of Holy 
Scripture and contemporary theology (including the works of the Fathers of 
the Church). This new authority independently claimed the right to settle con-
flicts betwe~n individuals, groups and public powers. Thejurists' demand that 
matters of a public nature be under the rule of law remains a living principle 
today. This feature is more a characteristic of our Western world than it is of 
any other past or contemporary civilization. 
These great accomplishments would have been unthinkable if the rediscov-
ery of ancient Roman jurisprudence had remained the privilege of a few. In 
fact, hosts of professional jurists were taught by the law faculties of Italy, 
France and, later, of every major European country. After the twelfth cen-
tury, the youth of the ruling classes and the clergy streamed to these faculties 
from every part of Europe. Eventually, even talented and ambitious com-
moners were admitted to study at these faculties. These law students returned 
home with a technical knowledge of administration, politics and diplomacy. 
Later, this knowledge was extended to the administration of justice. 
North of the Alps at least, the diplomatic, political and administrative ac-
tivities of these new professionals always preceded developments in the ad-
ministration of civil justice. The jurists first attained their public positions by 
rising through the large administrative apparatus of the Church or that of the 
Holy Roman Empire, the western European kingdoms, the greater feudal ter-
ritories or the larger cities. Only through these channels did they advance to 
key positions in the central courts of the sovereigns and eventually to the com-
mon and local courts. The unschooled decision-makers of the Estates - the 
prelates, knights and representatives of the cities - resisted the encroachment 
of the jurists for a long time. This resistance was due in part to political 
mistrust of the sovereign and in part to their own material interests in their 
financially lucrative privileges. However, as the political power of the Estates 
began to crumble, the jurists began to occupy these positions as well. They 
made advances even in places like northern France, the Netherlands, the cities 
of the German Hansa and in Switzerland: in short, in regions where national 
or local law had been maintained. 
C. The Role if Ecclesiastical Legal Science 
To omit mention of the simultaneous development of an ecceliasticallegal 
science would leave this outline incomplete. Until the Reformation, the 
Church was not only universal in Europe but was also by far Europe's largest 
20. The exegesis oflegally relevant texts by Rabinnic or Islamic scholars - which was in some 
ways similar - had confined itself to religious texts which originally did not belong to a specially 
legal subsystem. 
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institution. The Church, which had always been a pioneer in promoting more 
objective and rational decision-making, began organizing its scattered legal 
sources into a corpus of canon law. This work was done under the influence of, 
and in competition with, the masters of the ius civile. When great canonists 
ascended to the papal throne at the end of the twelfth century, they trans-
formed the Church into a legalistic Church, a universal body vested with a cen-
tral legislation, administration and jurisdiction. The system of codified ec-
clesiasticallaw occupied a parallel position to that of the ius commune, and the 
"canonist" paralleled the "legist.' '21 Since ecclesiastical law also governed 
many secular claims, thereby serving to develop a complementary relationship 
between the ius commune and the ius canonicum, both legal systems were increas-
ingly seen as expressions of one universal legal order, the ius utrumque. 
D. Later Developments in the Growth of European Law 
These developments led to an intensified legalization and rationalization of 
public life in Europe. The jurists in the service of the ruling powers were 
gradually able to supplant the use of violence in the settling of conflicts and to 
eliminate private or community feuds - something which the Church and the 
monarchs had never fully achieved by the earlier medieval peace movements 
(treuga Dei Landfrieden, etc.). Thus, the jurists prepared the ground for eco-
nomic expansion and for the gradual humanization of the European modern 
age. 
While I cannot discuss the brilliant history of legal science and the expan-
sion of the learned Roman law in detail,22 it is appropriate to mention the out-
standing landmarks in the further history of this process. These would in-
clude: (1) the elegant jurisprudence of the French and Dutch Humanists; (2) 
the newer school of natural law which was greatly influenced by Roman law; 
and (3) the revival of ancient Roman law in Savigny's historical school and in 
Pandectism. In some parts of Europe, in many regions of Germany, for exam-
ple, the direct application of Roman law did not terminate until 1900. Even 
today, however, Roman law is alive; the continental codifications are based so 
much on Roman law that interpretation of them would remain incomplete or 
superficial without recourse to the Corpus luris. For an American audience, 
these events on the continent are ofless consequence. In the Anglo-American 
legal system the immediate influence of Roman law is restricted to a relatively 
small body of civil law . 23 Rather than continuing with a history of the specific 
influences of Roman law, I would like to comment in conclusion on the 
general outlook of contemporary western legal thought. 
21. "Legist" was the term used by medieval churchmen in referring to an expert in Justi-
nianic law. 
22. Further discussion of the subsequent expansion of the schooled Roman law in modern 
times is omitted for the same reason I did not pursue the later development of antique Roman law 
earlier. See Part One, §§ IV, V of text, supra. 
23. See Part One, § n.B of text, supra. 
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IV. ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 
A. Modern Historical Consciousness 
In western, southern and central Europe, Roman law has always been a 
subject taught by our faculties of law because it provides the necessary 
background for interpreting our own civil law. But the present crisis in mat-
ters of historical consciousness has had negative effects on the study of Roman 
law. The reasons for that crisis are obvious. We have entered an era of greater 
control of nature and futurist social planning. The Atlantic-European civiliza-
tion has been transformed into a world civilization of" older" and "younger" 
nations. Similarly, there is the educational explosion which has made it 
necessary for many nations to offer the opportunity of elementary and 
specialized education to millions of young people; this development has led to 
a critical questioning of classical education. The humanistic study of the an-
cient languages, the classical systems of philosophy, idealistic historiography 
and even classical Newtonian physics are undergoing a new evaluation. 
Roman law belongs to this classical tradition. 
I will not elaborate, however, on this educational and social trend for two 
reasons. First, growing criticism of one-sided technical specialization every-
where has brought forth a stronger interest in history. Thus, apologies for 
Roman law which I found necessary ten years ago before German and other 
European audiences would sound anachronistic today. Second, an apology of 
this kind is of minor interest in this country where Roman law was never in 
force, and was therefore not cultivated in connection with law but in connec-
tion with the classics, because of its obvious relevance to the economic and 
social history of antiquity. Consequently, I will simply point out the value 
which the study of Roman law can have for the student and graduate. 
B. The Uses of Roman Law in the Modern World 
In the continental countries, ancient and medieval law belongs to the 
"prehistory," so to speak, of current law. The knowledge of Roman law is 
often a prerequisite to a basic understanding of the legal norms in force. An 
understanding of Roman law is also important for the critical evaluation of 
present or proposed legislation. Indeed, the battle against the historical 
misunderstandings of older or contemporary legislators is frequently won by a 
better appreciation of the Roman legal sources. One need only think of how 
much the appreciation of the continental doctrine of unjust enrichment might 
be advanced by greater understanding of its Roman underpinnings. 
These general reasons for studying Roman law do not directly apply to 
students of the Anglo-American legal system. Other considerations, however, 
of a more general nature make the knowledge of Roman law worthwhile to an 
American audience. 
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In certain matters, one must frequently rely on the terminology, definitions 
and norms of a basically Romanistic civil law. This is so with international 
business transactions, in the field of conflicts of law whenever foreign law is 
applied by courts as the lex fori and in questions of the unification of legal 
norms among countries of the Anglo-American and the continental legal 
orders. Due to the common fundamental principles of western legal thought, 
the terminology of Roman law still provides a universal language. 24 In a more 
technical sense, Roman law terms are also the general vocabulary for com-
parative law and for one of the major problems of conflicts of law, the problem 
of' 'characterization" of a legal norm or institute. This ius commune, moreover, 
often constitutes a common set of values in conflicts between citizens of dif-
ferent nations. Thus, in such situations, Roman law facilitates agreement in 
principle. Similarly, one should recall the great part the ius commune played in 
the development of modern public international law. 25 This code of com-
munication has become even more important because of the modern trend 
toward unification of laws. The common language of Roman law has 
facilitated the attainment of a certain uniformity of statutes which, in turn, has 
become a decisive factor in the advancement of international organizations. 
The utility of Roman law, however, is not restricted to its direct effects on 
the content of modern legal systems. There is another significant contribution 
of Roman law to the training of the law student, including those in America. I 
am referring to the "classical" law in its original form. The Roman jurists' 
exemplary method of decision-making still has relevance for the modern 
jurist. 26 The decision-making method of these old masters contributes to the 
appeal they can still have for the modern jurist. He can learn the Roman 
jurist's method of clearly distinguishing legal issues and making those issues 
precise - an exercise which is essential for the objectification of social and 
political conflicts. Similarly, he can try to develop their sure instinct for the 
reality and practicability of legal solutions. He can, moreover, observe how 
they arrived at new and elegant solutions through the disciplined use of legal 
imagination, Even today, nothing develops the ability to discover the underly-
ing legal issue in statutes or precedents more than the study of the casuistry of 
the classical jurists. The exegesis of Roman legal texts, which is customary for 
many law students in my country, often fascinates my practical-minded stu-
dents even more than those who are interested in legal history. To observe this 
has always been a very enlightening personal experience for me. 
24. Roman law provides, in the words of Sir Henry Sumner Maine, a lingua franca. To use a 
more modern term, it is the key code to understanding among jurists all over the world. 
25. The ius commune has played a great part in the development of modern public international 
law since the times of the Spaniards in the sixteenth century and of Selden, Grotius and others in 
the seventeenth century. 
26. See Part One, § IV.C of text, supra. 
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There is yet one more way in which familiarity with classical Roman law is 
of va hie in the modern world. The decisions of the classical jurists are a touch-
stone for testing many issues affecting the general theory of law today. The 
high "specific density" of their concentrated situational analysis provides an 
ideal test. I~ this way, the most eminent achievements of Roman jurists enable 
us to verify propositions and models, e.g., of "legal axioms," of "logical em-
piricism," of' 'realism," of the so-called topica iuris and of the nouvelle rhetorique. 
Above all, their achievements offer an ideal paradigm for the theory of 
decision-making and of legal reasoning which is debated so heatedly even in 
this country. I believe that it is this paradigm which could prevent the present 
debate in legal theory from degenerating into one-sided or sterile dogmatism. 
The talent of the classic Roman jurists for providing answers can still be put to 
use in our society today - not only for the contemplative researcher but 
especially for the practical jurist who is confronted with new tasks daily. Fabula 
et de te narratur; this old story also applies to us today. 
